## Galbraith and the Problem of Uneven Development

Jim Peach

ABSTRACT: This article examines John Kenneth Galbraith's contributions to the field of economic development. Galbraith's works on economic development were numerous, but they remain largely ignored by his critics and fans alike. He approached the economic development problem with a keen understanding of both the economic and political forces shaping the development debate. Galbraith's contributions to development economics were always focused on how to get the job done. Doing so required different strategies in an exceedingly diverse community of nations. His work remains relevant. The literature is only now beginning to recognize that this holistic approach to development is a necessary alternative to single-causation theories of world poverty. Galbraith's approach to development problems is consistent with (and perhaps inspired by) original institutional economics (OIE) in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen and Clarence Ayres.

Keywords: Galbraith, development, poverty

JEL Classification Codes: B2, B5, B25, B52, O10

John Kenneth Galbraith and "some of his younger colleagues" taught one of the first courses on economic development offered in the United States in the early 1950s. The course was motivated by "... the considerable number of students at Harvard from poor countries who were studying the sophisticated and, for them, often irrelevant models of the modern advanced economy" (Galbraith 1994, 161). Again and again, Galbraith returned to the idea that not everything produced, learned or taught in the developed world had meaning for the developing nations. But when Galbraith attempted to have economic development accepted as an approved field of study for a PhD in economics at Harvard, there was little interest: "... my request was promptly and, in keeping with accepted academic style, rather righteously rejected. As a different field of study, the special economics of the poor countries was held not to exist" (1979, 27).

The author is Regents Professor of Economics at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico.

Jim Peach

Galbraith's contributions to the field of economic development were numerous, remain largely ignored and are consistent with (and perhaps inspired by) original institutional economics (OIE). Various similarities of Galbraith's development works with the OIE tradition will be pointed out in the remainder of this article. Three of these similarities should be described now to set the stage for the rest of the discussion.

First, Galbraith, like many of his OIE colleagues, regarded economic development as a historical process and not, like the growth theorists, a goal with a definite end in sight: "More specifically, we must recognize that economic development is a process . . . ." (1962, 12). Second, it was apparent to Galbraith that examining the process of economic development meant examining the entire structure of society and not just some (micro) part. In his words (1962, 5), "[w]e have been enthusiastically and quite capably discussing the parts of the problem; we have paused all too infrequently to inquire whether they fit into a viable whole." If these two points sound familiar, they should. Gunnar Myrdal (1974) defined economic development as occurring in a process with no beginning and no end. For Myrdal (1974, 729), economic development meant "the upward movement of the entire social system." And, while Myrdal's words are quoted here, the similarity to Veblen, Ayres, Gordon and others should also be apparent.

Third, for Galbraith and the OIE tradition, uneven development and poverty were not the result of a shortage of natural resources. More than once, Galbraith dismissed the scarcity of natural resources argument citing numerous counterexamples. These included, among others, the rapid expansion of the economies of Japan and Taiwan (both resource poor) and the relative poverty of West Virginia (a resource rich area). Poverty of individuals and nations resulted from many causes and it was rather silly to assign the blame to a shortage of natural resources. The constraints on the development process were to be found elsewhere – perhaps the shortage was in public administration, access to education and health-care, feudalistic landlords who inhibited the growth of agriculture, inadequate investment, or perhaps a combination of all these factors and more.

In his various writings about economic development, Galbraith addressed nearly all of the major topics generally found in current economic development textbooks (e.g., Cypher and Dietz 1997). The list of these topics is truly impressive and included the definition of economic development, development theory, the role of savings and investment, development planning, the distribution of income, foreign aid, population, migration, colonialism, the role of the state, agricultural versus industrial development, the role of the entrepreneur and the modern corporation, multi-national organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, technological change, international trade, and investment in human capital. Fortunately, Galbraith was not writing a textbook nor was he addressing his fellow economists. Galbraith's intent was to inform policy-makers and the public – and, yes, probably also to sell some books. The style of his development writings was unmistakably Galbraithian – that is, he did not hide his well-developed sense of history or his equally well-developed sense of humor.

#### The Context

Galbraith's perspectives on economic development were, of course, shaped in part by his experience as Ambassador to India during the Kennedy Administration and described in his all too detailed diary-like book, Ambassador's Journal (1969). His (1962) book on economic development was an edited version of a series of lectures he gave while he served as ambassador. Ambassadors were frequently called upon to give a series of speeches and public presentations without creating a diplomatic crisis. The economic development theme seemed ideal to Galbraith to serve this purpose. Galbraith's international experience was not confined to India and his travels also produced books about Poland and Yugoslavia (1958) and China (1973).

Galbraith approached the economic development problem with a keen understanding of both the economic and political forces shaping the development debate. In addition to the rising expectations of the people of numerous newly independent nations in the post-war environment, there was, of course, the cold war. Development issues in the 1950s and 1960s were almost always debated in the context of the conflicting interests of the Western market-oriented model and the Soviet planning model. In both cases, however, the emphasis was on industrialization as a development model. As always, Galbraith understood that the reality was more complex than the ideology. "I do not argue that the distinction between the planned and the unplanned economy is without meaning. But most of what the professional ideologists say about the distinction is without meaning. Many things must be planned even in those economic systems where the market has a major role" (1962, 34-35). And, Galbraith continued: "To trust to the market is to take an unacceptable risk that nothing, or too little, will happen" (1962, 35).

Galbraith was also acutely aware that economic development was not the highest priority of the Kennedy Administration. Despite considerable rhetoric on the importance of development, the creation of the Peace Corps, and the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy administration's highest priorities were related directly to the Cold War. The Berlin wall crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, above ground nuclear testing, and the possibility of nuclear war in which hundreds of millions of people might die were perhaps justifiably higher priorities for President Kennedy and his administration than peasant agriculture in the Indian State of Bihar. Galbraith assumed that the relatively low priority given to economic development would not change in subsequent administrations. He was correct.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, development economics was still dominated by the theory of economic growth. Galbraith was well aware of the developments in growth theory although he regarded many of the models as incomprehensible. Worse, the growth models implied a single formula (more below) for all economic development problems. The difference between the poor nations and the wealthy nations according to the growth theorists was rather simple. Starting with a production function in which output depended on capital and labor, it was an easy matter to conclude that the poor nations lacked capital but had no shortage of labor.

The remedy was equally simple (save more or receive foreign aid) and the solution was universal.

Galbraith's published work on economic development preceded most of what is now considered standard material in the development literature. Most of what passed for development literature in the 1950s and early 1960s was growth theory or inspired by growth theory.

Galbraith was concerned about poverty – no matter where the poor happened to live. He explicitly recognized two general types of poverty. "There is that which afflicts the few or, in any case, the minority in some societies. And there is the poverty that afflicts all but the few in other societies" (1979, 1). When he began writing *The Affluent Society* (1958) the title he had in mind was *Why People are Poor* (1979, 26).

### Three Types of Development

Galbraith described three types of development "... which are currently, more or less in vogue" (1964, 4). Symbolic modernization provided the trappings but not the substance of economic development. The emphasis in symbolic modernization was on what every nation must have to appear as if it is a developed nation. These items include airlines, steel mills, a modern capital city, and appropriate consumption levels for the rich. This was a strategy for "fooling people into believing that something was being done" (1964, 5). A strategy of maximized economic growth was the development model most closely associated with Western economic thought. The goal of this strategy was the greatest possible increases in output without regard to the composition of output. In this context, investment, savings and tax policies are all designed to simply increase output - even if the short-run increases in output had little relation to long-term development goals. There was no consideration of income distribution, education, health or other issues that might ultimately be better policies. Finally, Galbraith pointed to a development model he called selective growth. This may have been a reference to the on-going debate over balanced growth (a la Nurkse and Rosenstein-Rodan) versus unbalanced growth advocated by Hirschman and Myrdal, but Galbraith made no reference to this debate. Galbraith found selective growth defective as well. "Thus, although there is widespread agreement on a policy of selective growth, there is very little agreement on what should be selected" (1964, 9).

Galbraith was acutely aware that there could be no single formula or solution to induce economic development that would apply to all nations at all times. There was little point, Galbraith argued, in applying the same remedies to India and the vastly different problems faced in Latin America or Africa. "What is the lesson? It is not that capital or technical assistance or technical training are unimportant or that planning is a waste of time. . . . The lesson is that we can no longer have one diagnosis of the causes of underdevelopment" (1962, 12). And, "[i]f we recognize a diversity of causes, we will take an eclectic view of remedies" (1964, 20).

More than four decades later, Jeffrey Sachs (2005) seems to have discovered Galbraith's pleas for differential diagnosis as if it were something new: ". . .

economists, like medical clinicians need to learn the art of differential diagnosis" (Sachs, 79). Sachs views were shaped in part by observing the ways in which his wife, a pediatrician, diagnosed illness among children. Sachs admitted that it took him twenty years to learn that differential diagnosis was the appropriate tool. Reading Galbraith's short book (1962) on development might have saved Sachs more than a little time and effort and many mistakes.

The standard prescription for economic growth (savings for capital investment) struck Galbraith as being wrong on several fronts. Galbraith's conception of the role of capital was heavily influenced by Theodore Schultz's (1953 and 1964) powerful argument concerning investment in human capital, particularly education. In fact, Galbraith's (as well as Schultz's) perspective on capital investment was strikingly similar to the institutionalist approach described by Veblen (1908a; 1908b). Veblen's (1908a, 517) analysis of the role of capital in the development process placed greater emphasis on access to the community's joint stock of technical knowledge rather than the physical stock of capital that most economists (including contemporary economists) emphasized. Ayres ([1944] 1962, xxi) was in turn powerfully influenced by Veblen's analysis of human capital. "The nature of human capital and its significance for economic development have never been more clearly stated than by Thorstein Veblen in his two essays 'On the Nature of Capital."

Galbraith wrote often about the misunderstood nature of capital and the errors of the helpful, well-intentioned rich nations. In his words:

The first was to assume that what physically existed in the advanced economy could be passed on to the poor, and the latter would then be economically developed. Steel mills, electrical generating works, chemical plants, the other heavy furniture of developed capitalism, should be so transmitted, and thus development would be accomplished. This too was deeply in conflict with reality and need. Poor, unskilled and illiterate people needed food, clothing and elementary medical care. (1994, 163)

Providing physical capital, Galbraith noted, was often wasteful, but especially wasteful early in the development process. "Indeed, there is a distinct possibility that capital provided to countries in the earliest stage of development will be wasted" (1962, 14). Instead, Galbraith suggested that Theodore W. Schultz's (1964) conclusion that investments in education in rural areas led to increased agricultural productivity was more to the point.

Galbraith was also at odds with the growth theorists for another reason. The early growth models inspired by Robert Solow's famous (1956) article unambiguously implied income convergence among nations. The convergence logic of the growth models was based mainly on the idea that the marginal product of capital was higher in areas of low income (and little capital) than in areas of high income (and abundant capital). According to this reasoning, capital should naturally flow from rich nations to poor ones and the growth rates in poor nations, therefore, would inevitably be

Jim Peach

30

higher than growth rates in high income nations. All nations were moving toward a common steady state. Conditional convergence, that is convergence and steady states dependent on initial conditions did not become popular until the 1980s. The idea of convergence was further bolstered by the fact of technological borrowing – not every nation had to go through the same lengthy sequence of developing technological solutions to industrial problems. The poor nations could, if allowed to do so, borrow from the already industrialized world.

Unlike the growth theorists, Galbraith argued that there was no inevitable escape from the equilibrium of poverty. Indeed, Galbraith saw the advantages of being first. Development, he argued (1962, 18), "becomes easier the farther it proceeds." Rather than convergence, Galbraith (1962, 18) saw a world in which "[t] he more developed countries are constantly widening their advantage over those that follow behind." Why was this so? Galbraith (1962, 18) asserted that "[g]iven no competent organs of public administration, it is hard to develop any. . . . Given no teachers, it is hard to launch an educational system. . . . Saving and accumulation are exceedingly painful in a poor country."

Education and other investments in human capital were for Galbraith, like Veblen, Ayres, and Schultz, a prerequisite to other investments. Immediately obvious to Galbraith was the fact that modern industry required a well-educated and well-trained work force. "Literate people will see the need for getting machines. It is not so clear that machines will see the need for getting literate people. So under most circumstances, popular education must have priority over the dams, factories, and other furniture of capital development" (1964, 42-43).

Also obvious was the dominance of agriculture in the poorest nations. Extreme poverty in most of the world was rural poverty. The escape from the rural poverty trap, if there was one, could not be accomplished without the provision of widespread educational opportunities. In Galbraith's words (1962, 49), "[n]o where in the world is there an illiterate peasantry that is progressive. Nowhere is there a literate peasantry that is not." Education was a necessary ingredient in attacking the poverty of the few in wealthy nations as well:

There is no place in the world where a well-educated population is really poor. If so, let us here in the United States select, beginning next year, the hundred lowest income counties . . . and designate them as special education districts. These would be equipped (or re-equipped) with a truly excellent and comprehensive school plant, including primary and secondary schools, transportation, and the best in recreational facilities. (Galbraith [1964] 1967, 129)

## Role of the Corporation

Given Galbraith's focus on the modern corporation in both *The Affluent Society* (1958) and *The New Industrial State* (1967), it is not surprising that he found a large role for the corporation in developing nations. His logic was straightforward.

Modern industrial production was large scale and required some form of large-scale organization. In his words (1964, 87) "... modern productive activity – the making of steel, aluminum fertilizer, trucks, or machine tools – requires a complex blending of skills and talents in a complex mosaic of tasks and functions." This description of industrial activity contrasts sharply with small-scale production so common, for example, in agriculture in many developing nations.

Modern industry requires, Galbraith argued timely decisions and coordination of activities. "Modern industrial processes are closely interdependent; delay in one place will ordinarily cause delay with cumulative effect elsewhere" (1964, 90). Institutionalists might detect Veblen's influence on Galbraith in this statement. In Veblen's ([1904] 1932, 10) words, "[n]o one of the mechanical processes carried on by the use of a given outfit is independent of other processes going on elsewhere." And, Veblen ([1904] 1932, 10) asserted that the industrial process imposed ". . . an unremitting requirement of quantitative precision, accuracy in point of time and sequence . . ." For both Galbraith and Veblen, the modern industrial corporation played a significant, if not always benign, role in industrial production that was not performed by other organizations. Only the corporation with considerable autonomy in decision making could accomplish the complex coordination requirements of modern industry. For Galbraith, it mattered little whether the corporation was publicly or privately owned. In either case, the corporation was essential.

### Resistance to Change

Galbraith, like Veblen, Ayres and Gordon, thought that resistance to change was a significant obstacle to economic progress. Such resistance could come especially from elites who were more than comfortable with the current situation. This was particularly the case in rural societies in which the distribution of land ownership gave considerable power and prestige to landlords who often performed little work but were able to appropriate through ownership rights a considerable portion of agricultural output. Such conditions did not bode well for the adoption of new technology or increases in agricultural output. In Galbraith's (1964, 43) words, "[t]he best considered forms of agricultural investment or techniques of agricultural production are worthless if the cultivator knows out of experience that none of the gains will accrue to him." But there was some hope for progress: "And the drive for development, in our day, is a force of considerable independent power, and it is not always kind to those who, in defense of vested interest, stand in the way" (1964, 48).

### Foreign Aid

As Ambassador to India, Galbraith was directly involved in one of the largest foreign aid programs of the early 1960s. He regarded that program as well intentioned, but not very effective. In his view, the more advanced economy could offer three things: (1) capital, (2) technology, and (3) organization. But what the so-called advanced economies had to offer did not always contribute to the solution. He

32 Jim Peach

also maintained that many of the developing nations such as India that were further along in the development process had much to offer other developing nations. "We see that no group of countries is uniquely qualified to extend assistance and no other group is completely condemned to the role of recipient" (1964, 51).

### **Planning**

For Galbraith, large endeavors required planning. Planning was as essential for the developing nation as for the more advanced economies. In the already industrialized world, such as the United States, Galbraith maintained that even in market-oriented economies, much planning occurred. He frequently cited the case of large corporations in the United States - some of which sold their goods only to the federal government. He also referred frequently to large-scale programs such as President Kennedy's proposal to land a man on the moon as an industrial activity that could not take place without careful planning. Indeed, he lamented the fact that the planning for a trip to the moon was far more thorough and competently done than planning for the much more urgent problem of economic development. Given that the development problem was larger and in many respects more complex than space travel, planning was a non-issue. It had to be done. In his words (1964, 66), "[f]or the developing country, the word planning has ceased to be controversial." But, he (1964, 67) warned that "[e]conomic development imposes, generally speaking, the greatest burdens on those governments that are least able to bear them."

Planning for economic development, however, as generally practiced was an investment strategy that Galbraith thought was necessary but incomplete. What was lacking was any serious consideration of consumption: "Development plans must also have a theory of consumption" (Galbraith 1962, 44). He made a strong case that much of the confusion over development strategy and investment strategy could be avoided by applying what he termed the popular consumption criterion. In his words, "[t]his goal anchors economic development to the consumption requirements, present and prospective, of the typical citizen – to the consumption, statistically speaking of the modal consumer" (1964, 10). The popular consumption criterion ". . fixes objectives and establishes the priorities in the distribution of planned investment" (1964, 12). "It also provides the basic guide in taxation and in the administration of exchange controls" (1964, 12).

## Population and Migration

Galbraith was not a Malthusian pessimist, but he was an early and consistent advocate of population control for developing nations, particularly India. While he was Ambassador to India, Galbraith was intimately involved with the China-India war. However, Galbraith regarded the internal threat from population growth as far greater than the threat from China (1964, 99). In the early 1960s, Galbraith (1964, 100) noted that India was adding about 10 or 11 million people (approximately the population of Belgium or Australia) to its population each year. "The care and

provisioning of this new population is the task the Indian economy sets for itself each year. In the foreseeable future there will be failure. The consequences will not be pleasant." The basic problem was that neither Indian agriculture nor industry could usefully employ more workers, workers with a marginal product that was barely positive. The result was, in Galbraith's view, an inevitable increase in long term unemployment and no possibility of escaping from the equilibrium of poverty. For Galbraith (1964, 101), "[t]he only remedy is the control of population."

Galbraith (1964, 100) maintained a very different view of population growth in Europe and the United States ". . . where more people mean more hands and more people at work and more products of all kinds to supply the added population." Any increases in European or U.S. unemployment rates as a result of population growth, unlike in India, could be handled by Keynesian demand management.

Galbraith thought that population control was a matter of such urgency that the developing nations could not afford to wait for the United States, handicapped by political fear of tackling a controversial subject, to help. The developing nations must take on the task themselves and the result should be judged only by decreasing birth rates. Who knows whether or not Galbraith's pronouncements about the importance of population control influenced Indira Ghandi's draconian (forced sterilization) programs of the 1970s or not. In any case, the crude birth rate in India decreased from 43.3 per thousand during the 1950 -55 period to 25.1 per thousand in 2000-05, while the total fertility rate dropped from 5.91 to 3.11 in the same time period (United Nations 2006). There were similar decreases in world birth rates.

Later, Galbraith also encouraged migration from the poor nations to the presumably labor short rich nations. "Migration, as we have seen, is the oldest action against poverty. It selects those who most want help. It is good for the country to which they go; it helps to break the equilibrium of poverty in the country from which they come" (1979, 136). But, Galbraith was quick to point out that migration could not be the only poverty solution or even the main one.

Galbraith thought that some aspects of the economic development problem were better presented as fiction. Galbraith's *The McLandress Dimension* (1968a), was a wonderfully humorous debunking of David McClelland's (1961) misguided attempt to measure achievement motivation in individuals and to attribute different levels of economic development to the presence or lack of achievement motivation. Even though Galbraith's attack on quantifying the unquantifiable was presented in less than the usual scholarly form, it is serious criticism of an idea that is still cited frequently in the economic development literature. Another of Galbraith's novels, *The Triumph* (1968b) is full of penetrating insights into the diplomatic and political side of the economic development problem. The central character of the novel is a Latin American dictator who despite various personal foibles becomes interested in the untouchable subjects of implementing land reform and various other kinds of income distribution issues. The unfavorable reaction of the U.S. Department of State is predictable but entirely believable. While *The Triumph* was a novel, Galbraith stated in the introduction: "This is a true story that I have tried to tell before in articles and

lectures. But it has occurred to me that maybe there are truths that best emerge from fiction" (1968, i).

#### An Assessment

Very few economists have approached economic development from a comprehensive, all encompassing perspective. Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, Clarence Ayres, and Gunnar Myrdal must surely be included on any list of those who have done so. John Kenneth Galbraith also should be included in that group. A less convincing case can be made for some other famous names in development economics including Raúl Prebisch. Others including Malthus, Ricardo, Joseph Schumpeter and Albert O. Hirschman belong in a second tier of contributors to economic development by the test of comprehensiveness despite their remarkable, if not always admirable, accomplishments. Those who have competently and sometimes eloquently addressed various aspects of development such as the growth theorists, the dependency theorists, and the structuralists, belong in a different category. The contributions of this latter group simply do not present a comprehensive perspective on the problem of economic development.

Though Galbraith's development economics was always presented in terms of the broader historical context with an emphasis on process, he did not engage in the popular past-time of attempting to present grand theory. There was, and is, no grand theory of economic development. Development is an evolutionary process. Instead, Galbraith's contributions to development economics were always focused on how to get the job done. Doing so required different strategies in an exceedingly diverse community of nations. His work remains relevant. Anyone seeking a broad, well-written, and highly insightful introduction to economic development would have a hard time finding a better starting place than reading Galbraith alongside Ayres (1962) introduction to *The Theory of Economic Progress*.

#### References

Ayres, Clarence E. The Theory of Economic Progress: A Study of the Fundamentals of Economic Development and Cultural Change. New York: Schoken Books, [1944] 1962.

Cypher, James M., and James L. Dietz. The Process of Economic Development. London: Routledge, 1997. Galbraith, John Kenneth. Journey to Poland and Yugoslavia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.

- ——. Economic Development in Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- ---. Economic Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- ——. "Let Us Begin: An Invitation to Action on Poverty." Harpers Magazine (March 1964). Reprinted in American Fiscal Policy: Experiment for Prosperity, edited by Lester Thurow. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967.
  - The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967.
- ----. The McLandress Dimension. New York: New American Library, 1968a.
- —. The Triumph: A Novel of Modern Diplomacy. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1968b.
- ---- Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1969.
- —. A China Passage. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973.
- —. The Nature of Mass Poverty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- —. The Voice of the Poor: Essays in Economic Persuasion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.

- ---. "A Look Back: Affirmation and Error." Journal of Economic Issues 23, 2 (1989): 413-416.
- A Journey Through Economic Time: A Firsthand View. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1994.
- -... "Challenges of the New Millennium." Finance and Development 36, 4 (December 1999): 2-5.
- Mankiw, Gregory N. "The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer." Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 4 (Fall 2006): 29-46
- McClelland, David C. The Achieving Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1961
- Myrdal, Gunnar. "What is Development?" Journal of Economic Issues VII, 4 (December 1974): 729-736.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
- Schultz, Theodore W. The Economic Organization of Agriculture. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953.
- ---. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
- Solow, Robert M. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth." 70,1(February 1956):65-94.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. Available at: http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2
- Veblen, Thorstein B. The Theory of Business Enterprise. New York: New American Library, [1904] 1932.
- —. "On the Nature of Capital: The Productivity of Capital Goods" Quarterly Journal of Economics 22, 4 (August 1908a): 517-522.
- ——. "On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangible Assets and the Pecuniary Magnate." Quarterly Journal of Economics 23, 1 (November 1908b): 104-136.

# **Symposium Contributors**

Michael C. Carroll is an Associate Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Regional Development at Bowling Green State University. His business and economics career dates from 1982 and includes service as a corporate controller, operations manager, and a corporate presidency. His research interests focus on institutional economics and regional economic development strategy. His first book, A Future of Capitalism: The Economic Vision of Robert Heilbroner was published by Macmillan and St. Martin's Press in 1998. His most recent books include Local Economic Development: Analysis and Practice (co-authored with John P. Blair) and Creating Enterprise: Repositioning Local Economic Development (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2008). Dr. Carroll earned his B.S. and M.S. degrees from Wright State University and his Ph.D. from Colorado State University.

James M. Cypher is a Professor of Economics in the doctoral program in Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico. He is the author of over 100 scholarly publications. His articles on U.S. military spending from a Veblenian institutionalist perspective include "Military Spending After the Cold War," Journal of Economic Issues, (June, 1991); "Institutions, Arms Spending and The State," in The Stratified State, William Dugger and William Waller, eds., (1992); and "The Military Sector," in Handbook on Institutional and Evolutionary Economics V.II, Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al., eds. (1994). In "Return of the Iron Triangle," Dollars and Sense (January/February 2002) and "From Military Keynesianism to Global-Neoliberal Militarism," Monthly Review (June 2007), he presented a post 9/11 interpretation of armaments spending. He is a member of the board of editors of the International Journal of Development Studies, Latin American Perspectives, Oikos (Chile) and the Journal of Economic Issues.

Richard Parker is an Oxford-trained economist who teaches at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He is the author of John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics, as well as books on the politics and economics of income distribution and on telecommunications policy. He co-founded Mother Jones, and sits on numerous boards including The Nation, Economists for Peace and Security, the Financial Markets Center, and ADA. He writes for many periodicals including the New York Times, Washington Post, LA Times, The Atlantic, The Nation, New Republic, and Le Monde Diplomatique. He is currently working on a book about the political and policy legacies of the Nixon Administration today.

Jim Peach is a Regents Professor of Economics and International Business at New Mexico State University where he has been a member of the faculty since 1980. His Ph.D. is from the University of Texas, Austin (1978). Peach is a former editor of the Journal of Borderlands Studies (1986-1995). He has served as president of the Rocky Mountain Council on Latin American Studies (1989), the Association of Borderlands

Studies (2000), the Association for Evolutionary Economics (2003) and the Western Social Science Association (2005). His research interests include income distribution, economic development, and demography. His recent teaching assignments include mathematical economics, intermediate macro-economics, economic development, the border economy, and the economics of sports.

James Ronald Stanfield is a Professor of Economics at Colorado State University, and Visiting Scholar at Bowling Green State University. He is the author of John Kenneth Galbraith; Economics, Power, and Culture: Essays in the Development of Radical Institutionalism; The Economic Thought of Karl Polanyi: Lives and Livelihood; Economic Thought and Social Change; and The Economic Surplus and Neo-Marxism, as well as over one hundred articles, reviews, and book chapters. He is past president of the Association for Evolutionary Economics, the Association for Social Economics, and the Association for Institutional Thought. He has received Colorado State University's Oliver Pennock Award for Outstanding Service and Commitment in Research and the John Stern Distinguished Professor Award. He was awarded the 2002 Thomas Devine Award by the Association for Social Economics and the 2006 Veblen-Commons Award by the Association for Evolutionary Economics.

William Waller is a Professor of Economics and Director of Wine Studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges where he has taught since 1982. He received his B.S. (1978) and M.A. (1979) in economics from Western Michigan University, and his Ph.D. in economics from the University of New Mexico (1984). He is past-president of the Association for Evolutionary Economics and the Association for Institutional Thought. He has served as a trustee of the Association for Social Economics, a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Economic Issues, and as a member of the board of directors of the Association for Evolutionary Economics; where he served for a year as acting Secretary-Treasurer. He is currently a trustee of the Association for Evolutionary Economics. He has co-edited two books, Alternatives to Economic Orthodoxy (M.E. Sharpe, 1987) and The Stratified State (M. E. Sharpe, 1992). His articles on institutionalist methodology, feminist economics, public policy and the work of Thorstein Veblen have been published in the Journal of Economic Issues, Review of Social Economy, History of Political Economy, and the Review of Institutional Thought as well as a number of edited collections. He is active in the Association for Evolutionary Economics, the Association for Institutional Thought, the Association for Social Economics and the International Association for Feminist Economics.

Mary V. Wrenn is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Weber State University, Ogden, Utah. She received her Ph.D. in economics from Colorado State University. Her major research focus is the nature of heterodox economics and its analysis of the evolution of capitalist economies. She has published in the Journal of Economic Issues, the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, and the History of Economics Review.